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The "take-off," one of the five stages of economic growth distinguished

w.w.

Rost~~, is"••• the great watershed in the life of modern societies•••
1
(when) growth becomes (a) normal condition," This aeronautical methaphor is

by

employed as a synonym for "industrial revolution," for Rostow notes that
"the take-off is defined as an industrial revolution, tied directly to radical

changes in methods of production, having their decisive consequence over a
2
Both the empirical validity and analytical
relatively short period of time."
worth of Rostow's analysis have been severely criticized,

3

It is by no means

evident either that economic growth has typically conformed to Rostow•s stages,
or that recent economic developments place the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
in the take-off stage.
Yet in the years after the Korean Har (1950-1953), something has happened
to transform a virtually stagnant economy in Korea into one of the world's most
rapidly growing economies in the 1960's.

4

When Professor Rostow visited Seoul

in the spring of 1969, he was quoted to the effect that "Korea might save four
115
or five years in completing the take-off stage.

The country's remarkable rrowth

in the last few_ years (real output rose 13 percent in 1968, almost 16 percent in
1969, and probably about 10 percent in 1970) has begun to attract widespread
attention,

6

This growth has also raised the question of whether the economy is

"taking-off" or not, a question which would never have been asked before 1963.
This question is essentially speculative.

Rostat~•s take-off is considered

to be a take-off into self-sustained growth, not an abortive flight followed by
a crash landing.

By 1981, observers should be able to answ@_t' the questiont but
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today they cannot.
elsewhere.
growth?

The interesting and fruitful issues now, in 1971, lie

In particular, what is the evidence of a shift from stagnation to

To what extent has change in the tempo of development been accompanied

by a restructuring of the economy?

Changes in the pace of growth are likely

to be marked not only by more of the same, but also by differences in kind.
What are the causes of accelerated growth?
what are the prospects for the future?

The costs and the benefits?

Finally,

Some of these questions, particularly

the last, are no less speculative than that of whether Korea is not-1 in the
take-off stage or not.

But the questions posed here are different in kind from

the take-off question, for evidence exists at present which can be used to
provide answers to such questions, even if only limited or intuitive answers.
I.

- The Evidence
Analysis of economic growth in Korea is usually limited to South Korea

in the period after liberation from the Japanese in 1945.

Though today's

Republic was once part of a unified Korea which, in turn, was a major link in
the Japanese empire, independence and division have created a new economy.
This economy cannot be legitimately compared either ~ith all of Korea or
the Southern provinces before 1945.
equal the whole.

The sum of the parts, for once, does not

Since continuous, reasonably reliable economic data extend

back only to 1953 or even later, this analysis is limited for practical reasons
to the period after the Korean War.
Gross national product (GNP) measured in constant (1965) prices is shown
in the chart and table at the end of the paper.

Constant-price or real GNP is

used here to disentangle the effects of price increase from output growth on
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GNP measured in current prices.

This is particularly necessary when rates .. ot__

inflation-vary sharply from year to yea-r (compare the 1964-65 with the.1965-66. ______price indexes shown.. in the .table•. i;olumn 3).

Real GNP is related in the chart .

-

to the GNP which would have resulted if output·had grown evenly (at a--constant.
_percentage rate) from 1953 to 1969.

Comparison reveals a gap which opened to

1962 before closing in later years. 7 With the exception of 1957 1 · growth before
1963 is of a different and lower order of magnitude than growth afterward.
(This is confirmed by the annual increase rates sho"m in the table, column 2).
The annual rate of increase in GNP averaged 4.6 percent from 1953 to 1962.
average more than doubled (to 10.9 percent) after 1962.

The

8

Private consumption and gross domestic capital formation, two major
components of expenditure on national product, are given in columns 5 and 7
of the table.

The consumption figures, divided by population estimates (column

4). show that the increase in average per capita consumption was insignificant
from the mid-1950's until the early 1960's.
almost 50 percent since then.

Individual consumption has risen ·

International comparison of consumption and other

expenditure components is known to be treacherous, but it is notewo~thy that
an average consumption of 23.3 thousand won in 1965, for example, was equivalent
to less than 90 dollars at the prevailing exchan~e rate,

An increase of 50

percent from such a level can only have profound and welcome welfare effects.
The increase in per capita consumption is a product of offsetting factors.
On

the one hand, GNP and total available resources (GNP plus net borrowing and

transfers from the rest of the world) have risen sharply in recent years while
the annual rate of population increase has declined from 3 percent in 1955-60

.....
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to 2.6 percent in 1960-66 and 1.9 percent in 1966-70.

The share of resources

(and GNP) going to capital formation (i.e. investment), on the other hand,
has increased too.

This is not entirely at the expense of consumption since

capital formation today increases output available for consumption or further
investment tomorrow.

Nevertheless, the rapid increase in 'domestic investment

from 10-12 percent of GNP in 1959-61 to almost 30 percent in 1967-69 (see table,
column 10) has probably held down consumption in recent years.
Capital formation and the share of capital formation in total output (the
investment ratio) both began to accelerate in 1963.

The rate of capital formation

is generally considered the primary determinant of economic growth in modem
growth theory.

To the extent that investment actually determines the rate of

increase in GNP, the rapid growth of investment to over a third of GrTT' in 1969
has been responsible for Korea's remarkable growth rates in recent years. 9
This investment has been financed from foreign and domestic sources (see
table, columns 8 and 9).

Domestic saving was negligible and even negative (when

measured in constant, 1965 prices) in earlier years, but began to increase in
1963, almost doubled between 1965 and 1966, and has risen since then to account
for more than half of total saving in 1967-69.

Foreign saving increased to 1957,

and then declined until 1966 before rising once more.
"Foreign saving" is calculated here by subtracting exports from imports
(and net factor income from abroad); it is pretty much eouivalent to Korea's
current-account balance of payments which, in turn, is dominated by merchandise
exports and imports (see table, columns 11 and 12).

The current-account balance

(a deficit each year since 1953) has been covered by foreip,n aid, particularly
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U.S.

aid, and by private lendinp:.

American aid and UNKP.A (United Nations Korean

Reconstruction Agency) supplies totaled 4.3 billion dollars between 1945 and 1969.
Approximately 1.8 billion dollars was received in the form of commercial loans
and direct private investment from 1959 through early 1970, mainly in 1966 and
afterward.

The decline in foreign savinp, since 1957 and its subsequent recovery

reflects the gradual reduction in aid levels and the more recent increase in
commercial borrowing.
Export growth since 1963 has been phenomenal.

ExnQrts doubled from 1963
Less

to 1965, and almost doubled again from 1965 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1969.

than a fifth of total exoorts were manufactures in 1957-59, but manufactures made
up more than three-fifths of the total by 19690

The rapid P.rowth of manufacturing,

the main component of the secondary sector (see table, column 15),~has-essentially
been export-led growth since 1963 or 1964.

10

Apricultural output has increased. too, but at a lesser rate since output has
had to rise from a much larger base.

11

The result has been a change in industrial

structure which accelerated in the mid-1960's.

The share of the secondary sector

rose almost 10 percentage ooints during the decade from 1953 to 1963-64.
another 10 points during the five years from 1964 to 1969.

It rose

This increase has

been almost wholly at the exnense of the nrimary sector (predominantlv agriculture),
since the share of the "other" sector (trade, transport, government, and the
remaining service industries) has reaained nuite stable.
Shifts in sectoral output shares are only one sign of the massive forces
in Korea that are transforming an agricultural, rural society into an urban,
industrial one.

Changes in labor force composition, the widening gap between farm
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and non-farm incomes, and flight to the cities are other signs.
Manufacturing employment doubled from 1963 to 1969.

The number of per

sons employed in agriculture actually dropped during the period.

Value added

per worker in agriculture averaged 127 thousand~ in 1968; the figure for
manufacturing was 340 thousand.

With a difference in productivity of this

magnitude, clearly economic development is not only a matter of increasing
output per worker in each sector, but also a process in which the center of
economic gravity shifts from low-productivity to high-productivity activities.
This shift has been accelerated in Korea by increasing urban-rural income
disparity.

Average annual farm-household income equaled 179 thousand won in
Urban

Annual incomes of urban wage-earner families averaged 221 thousand.

1968.

wages quadrupled from 1963 to 1968; farm-household income rose 92 percent.
The standard of living (real income) of urban workers doubled during this period
while farm families were no better off in 1968 than they were in 1963.

12

Is

it surprising that the number of non-farm households lias increa~ed-four times

as fast as the number of farm households in recent years?

Or that Seoul's

population rose from 2.4 to 5.5 million persons during the past decade?
The evidence here, to summarize briefly, shows a marked acceleration in
the pace of economic growth after 1963 or 1964 which distinguishes more recent
years from the decade 1953-1962.

This acceleration is seen in annual rates of

increase in GNP, per capita consumption, capital formation, and in the investment
ratio.

It is also found in the shifting sectoral distribution of output.

The

share of manufactures, led by exports, has risen while agriculture's share has
fallen.

This shift has its counterpart in the labor force, where a larger

proportion of workers now works in factories rather than in the fields, and in
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population distribution, as Korea becomes increasinr,ly urbanized.

Insofar as

the process described here, to quote Rostow, "·•• (is) tied directly to radical
changes in methods of production, havinp, their decisive consequences over a
relatively short period of time," then Korea's take-off began seven or eight
years ago.

The take-off concept itself, as noted earlier, is subject to major

reservations.

Moreover, that this acceleration in the temoo of economic activity

really constituted a take-off is also debatable, since we have not yet had the
benefit of sufficient hindsip.:ht to test the hypothesis adequately.

Fhatever one

wishes to call it, the major shift in Korea's economic situation deserves an
explanation.
II.

An explanation is offered in the next section of this paper.

- The Causes
Any evaluation of the acceleration in I~orea 's rate of economic development

in the early 1960's must explain why prowth was slow from the end of the Korean

War to approximately 1963, what hapnened at the tiMe to change the situation,
and why subsequent growth has been so rapid.
Slow growth after the Korean Har is difficult to understand in the immediate
historical context.

The war was responsible for about one million casualties

in the South :frof\1 a population of 20 million.

Physical damage was estimated to

al~ost equal the value of total output in 1953. 13

Reconstruction of the

shattered economy should have resulted in hip:h grouth rates if only because
output reached very lou levels durin!! the war.

The answer to this apparent

paradox is that the battle line stabilized in early 1951, while agricultural
and industrial output recovered to pre-war levels by 1953.

Recovery was

remarkably swift, a tribute to the Korean people, but earlier output levels were
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low and the basic problems which had bedeviled the economy still persisted.

14

Liberation from Japan and division of the Korean peninsula in 1945 had
left the South a truncated part of a major component of the former Japanese
Korea's comparative advantage within the Yen Bloc in producing rice,

Empire.

iron ore, chemicals, and other products ended with liberation in 1945.

Separation

of the country into North and South broke up a highly complementary economy in
which rice and barley were mainly gro~,m in the South, beans and cereals in the
North.

Most textiles and machine tools were manufactured in the South, while

metal and chemical (especially fertilizer) production was centered in the North.
The division of an interdependent economic system clearly caused many
problems.

For example, light bulbs fabricated in Korea used tungsten filaments

imported from Japan.

Korea had exported the tungsten ore to Japan, but now had

no filament-making facilities.

Similar examples of disrupted economic ties

could be listed indefinitely, but the major case in the South after liberation
was in agriculture, and the immediate results were hunger and rice riots.
Though "starvation exports" of rice no longer had to be shipped to Japan,
the domestic supply was inadequate because fertilizer could not be obtained
from the North.

Also, there were more mouths to feed.

The population of

the South rose from 16 million in 1944 to over 20 million in 1948-49 as many
Koreans returned from Japan and ~anchuria and others emir.rated from the North.

15

The American Military Government (AMG) under General Hodge, faced with severe
economic and political problems it was not adecuately prepared to handle, eventually
established compulsory rice collection and brought fertilizer to replace that
no longer available from the North.
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In addition to the major problem of feeding a swollen population, the
AMG faced a host of other immediate problems.

One was that plant and

equipment had been run down and the economy cannibalized to meet war needs. 16
Korea's capital stock was consequently in poor shape.

Limited productive

capacity and severance of former economic ties combined to cause massive
unemployment.

17

Also, the Japanese had monetized their assets (life insurance

policies were paid out in full, etc.) in preparation for departure.
plus shortages of necessities led to rampant inflation in 1945. 18

Monetization
The United

States responded to these problems during the occupation with a series of
relief measures.

Aid imports, for example, were composed mainly of food and

raw materials rather than equipment.
rather than a development program.

This was essentially a holding operation

19

After the occupation forces left, an independent Republic of Korea was
established under the presidency of Syngman Rhee in August 1948.

It was now

becoming evident that this dismembered ex-colony would have to be transformed
into a viable, independent economy.

As a result, American aid policy began to

shift from relief to longer-term development aid. 20

The issues now were how

to develop economic independence and what to do first.
The basic outlook in 1948 appeared bleak.

Only a fifth of the land area

was arable yet Korea had one of the world's highest population densities.

The

economic structure was lopsided, with redundant export industries on the one hand
and insufficient capacity to meet domestic needs on the other.
of the population was illiterate at the time of liberation.

Three-quarters

After the Japanese were

repatriated, Korea was left with virtually no administrative, managerial, or
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technical manpower.
Hhen the Korean War erupted less than two years after the founding of
the Republic, too little time had passed and the political situation was too
turbulent to expect much economic progress or the establishme:::i.t· of economic
programs. The period from the armistice in July 1953 to the student revolution
in April 1960 was sufficiently long, however, for government economic priorities
to be set and for development efforts to show results.

Land refonn was

completed by 1958; food production rose roughly 50 percent from 1949 to 1959;
illiteracy was reduced sharply, and primary education greatly expanded.

In-

dustrial production doubled from 1955 to 1960, largely through import substitution.
Despite these gains, the overall pace of growth was unsatisfactory.

Real out;.mt

rose at an annual average rate of 5 percent from 1953 to 1959, but three-fifths
of this increase was eaten up by population growth.
Given the basic outlook in 1948 and the havoc of the Korean War, one may
argue that any progress was sufficient and that satisfactory rates of development
could not be expected for several generations.

This argument is simplistic

because it fails to recognize the favorable factors. Korea had been well along
22
Though higher-level talent
the road to industrial development by 1939-41.
was missing, the more basic skills were available,

Also, the United States was

already committed in 1948 to help Korea become '.'a display window of democracy.

023

The conunittment was strengthened by the Korean Par so that large-scale aid in
the 1950's gave Korea one of the world's highest levels of per-capita assistance.

24

Hhat progress occurred before 1960 was achieved despite the lack of any
coherent government economic program and despite the handicap of mistaken economic

21
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. i es. 25
po11.c

These can be blamed on inexperienced administration, but the

basic cause was President Rhee.
for economic development. 26

He knew little of economics and had no plan

The first opportunity for any sort of coordinated

government economic policy occurred when the Rhee regime was overthrown in
May 1960.

The successor government of Dr. John M. Chang (Chang Mye>n) was

too brief and unstable for new economic policies to be adopted before it was
turned out by a military coup in -:-1ay 1961. 27

The military junta, led by

General Park Chung Hee, was succeeded in 1963 hy civilian government under
General (new President) Park.

The government since 1961, unlike that in

earlier years, has been a stable, conti~uous force with pronounced economic
goals.

28

The economic slowdo\m in 1959-1962 (see table, column 1) was due to
poor crops in 1959-60 and again in 1962, and the disruption and uncertainty

which followed the student revolution and military coup in 1960 and 1961.
A poorly conceived currency reform in June 1962 also had a depressing effect
on economic activity.

By 19 63, however, better harvests and heavy investment

in First Five-Year Plan (1962-1966) projects caused GNP to rise substantially.
Rapid growth from 1963 on can be attributed to planning, new policies,
'

accidental factors, and basic sources of economic strength.

Like computers,

five-year plans have been endowed with powers they do not possess and made
the subject of much economic science fiction.

To be taken seriously a plan

must be more than a shonping list of projects, and more than an exercise
in futility by government economists who either lack the information needed to
draw up an adeq_aate plan or whose government is unwilling or unable to
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implement one.

If a plan meets the necessary conditions for credibility,

then it can be used like a map on which the course of the economy has been
plotted for the next five years.

As is often the case with maps, however,

the map may prove misleading, there may be detours due to unforeseen circumstances,
or one may miss signs and either overshoot or stop short of the destination.
In Korea, unlike many other developing countries, the five-year plans
can be taken seriously.

The Second Plan (1967-1971), with annual modi

fication, has served as a guide to the country's economic future and so,
to a lesser extent, did the First Plan.

The Third Plan (1972-1976), which

is now being prepared, will undoubtedly perform the same function.

The First

and Second Plans established aggregate growth-rate targets and sectoral output
goals.

The amounts of foreign and domestic investment needed to meet the

various targets are specified.

Less detailed information on savings sources

and labor requirements is also provided,

Each plan, despite inclusion of

a proposal to achieve self-sufficiency in food P,rains production, has emphasized
industrialization with particular stress on the expansion of manufactures. 29
The plans set targets but usually do not specify how they are to be
reached.

This appears, at first sight, to be dodging the issue.

When plans

are being constructed, however, the anpropriate choice of policies needed to
implement them is not readily apparent"

Nor is the quantitative effect of

a particular policy decision likely to be known in advance, though attempts
are of course made to predict such thinfs.

A nstabilization p;:-ogram," or set

of new policies adopted in 1963-1965, does not anµear in the plans.
program had a major impact on Plan achievement and subsequent p.:rowth.

This
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Government deficits, financed mainly by borrowing from the central bank,
had been the main factor responsible for increase in the ~oney supply and a
chronic cause of inflation since 1954.

Beginning with the budgets of 1963-

64, budgets were adjusted -- first by holding down expenditure, later by
increasing revenues -- so that the government would be a net saver rather than
a net borrower.

This new role of government as saver has limited inflation

which, at Korean rates, has probably retarded development. 30

To the extent

that the increase in government saving is greater than the reduction in saving

of those whose taxes rose, and insofar as government funds are used more
productively than the same funds would have been were they still in private
hands, greater government saving has also contributed directly to economic
growth.
A major de.valuat;f;on \Of the

per dollar).

~

took place in June 1964 (from 130 to 255

The won has since depreciated to 315 per dollar at the end of 1970,

The 1964 devaluation, and the simultaneous elimination of multiple-exchange
rate devices and relaxation of quantitative import restrictions, all made
export more attractive relative to domestic sales for Korean producers.

The

import liberalization which accompanied devaluation expanded government revenues
(from duties on imports), sustained counterpart fund receipts, and reduced the
profiteering and resource misallocation which occur when the price of foreign
exchange is too low to reflect its actual scarcity.

Liberalization has also

limited the growth of noncompetitive, low-productivity industries which flourish
like weeds behind the protective import barriers used to prop up an overvalued
currency.
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The interest- rate "reform" of September 1965 was another dramatic policy
The basic loan rate (on bills) was doubled, while rates on some time
31 Like devaluati on, the purpose of
and saving deposits more than doubled.

move.

the reform was to correct unrealist ic prices, in this instance the prices
paid to savers and charged to borrowers .

The average annual rate of inflation

(19 percent) had been above the bill rate (14 percent) and payments on savings
deposits (15 percent or less) in 1960-65.

Savers were being asked to subsidize

borrowers , which is patently ridiculou s in a capital-s carce country like Korea.
The results were predictab le.

Demand for loans exceeded supply, and supply

was limited because savers placed their funds in the unorganiz ed money market.
With reform, savings deposits in banks doubled between September 1965 and
April 1966.

As with fiscal stabiliza tion, the interest- rate reform can be

evaluated according to how much it increased savtn~s and whether savings were
better utilized after the event than before.

Most of the new deposits in banks

were probably transferr ed froM the private (unorgani zed) market.

Since private

lending is illegal, the size and loan characte ristics of the unorganiz ed market
are unknown.

It is probable, however, that the reform increased saving and

improved the overall utilizatio n of loans.
Devaluati on and the interest- rate reform both constitut ed readjustm ent of
administe red prices which had gotten out of line.

In addition, a series of

more positive measures were adopted to promote exports and encourage foreign
lending.

Tax exemption , easy access to low-cost loans, and direct subsidies

have been used to encourage export.
rate was 285

~

By the spring of 1969, when the exchange

per dollar, these incentive s were estimated to be worth from
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40 to 52 won per dollar's worth of exports.

32

Foreign lending has been encouraged by political stability, rapid
growth of exports (which provide the foreign exchange needed to repay loans),
and Korea's limited foreign-deb t service obligations .

In addition, the

Bank of Korea and more recently the Korea Exchange Bank have guaranteed re
payment of foreign loans.
liabilities (guarantee

The results can be seen in the foreign currency

acceptances ) of these banks.

Acceptances totaled

26 billion llim. in 1965; they reached 413 billion~ by August 1970.

The

increase in exports has already been seen (table, colmnn 11).
Random or exogenous events with major consequence s for the Korean economy
have included atypical weather and war in Vietnam.

In 1964 and 1966, for

example, harvests were unusually good because weather conditions were
particularl y favorable,

Draught was largely responsible for a drop in the

GNP growth rate from 13.4 percent in 1966 to 8.9 percent in 1967.

The influence

of weather on growth should diminish as agriculture 's share in total product
declines.
Merchandise exports to Vietnam reached a peak of almost 14 million dollars
in 1966 before declining more recently.

Most of the war related dollar earnings,

however, have come from "sales to U.N. forces" (mainly to the two U.S. divisions
stationed in Korea, but also an unspecified amount of receipts from Vietnam)
and U.S. offshore procurement , which includes payments to Korean contractors
in Vietnam and costs of maintaining Korean troops stationed in Vietnam since
1966.

Receipts from these sources (presumably included under "government ,

n.i.e,, military transaction s" in the balance of payments) doubled from 1966
to 1969.

They accounted for a little over 20 percent of total exports of goods
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· 33
and services in 1969.

As Japan benefitted from the Korean War, so has Korea

benefitted from war in Vietnam.

34

Basic resources or elements of economic strength, most of which existed
before 1963, have permitted Korea's rapid growth in recent years.

Without

such resources, the best planning, most sophisticated policies, or simple good
luck are likely to prove ephemeral.

Their possession may be a necessary con

dition for rapid growth, but it is not a sufficient condition since these
resources were part of Korea's economic endowment during the earlier era of
unsatisfactory progress.
A literate, relatively well-educated labor force is perhaps the main element
of Korea's economic strength.

Expenditure on education of seven to eight percent

of GNP, which is undoubtedly above the international average, has given Korea
an educational system on par with semi-advanced countries like Norway.

35

Stress

in education has been on quantity rather than quality, but Korean workers have
probably been better able than most to adopt the new technioues and develop
36
the new skills required by rapid industrializati on.
A second element is Korea's relatively well developed infrastructure.
Though the transport and communications networks inherited from the colonial
era were oriented toward North-South traffic, while East-Hest movement became
more important after partition, the ne~vorks have been expanded to meet the
increased demand generated by a growing nopulation and increasing levels of
economic activity.

The recently completed Seoul-Pusan expressway is a note

worthy case in point.

Similarly, electric output has risen sharply in recent

years (generation doubled from 1962 to 1966, and doubled again from 1966 to 1969).
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Inadequat e infrastru cture could have easily constitut ed a crippling bottlenec k
for industria lization in Korea.
construct ion industry.

That it has not is largely due to the

The supply of skilled workers and productio n of

construct ion materials have both been sufficien t to meet most of the demand for
net~ overhead facilitie s in recent years.
Other elements which deserve more attention than can be given here are
Korea's size, ethnic and linguisti c homogene ity, location, and social and
political structure .

Size in this context refers not only to area (about equal

to Indiana), but also to populatio n, now almost 32 million.

Neither area nor

populatio n are so large as to hamper communic ation or overtax administr ation,
as in India or China, nor is the country so small that the internal market
cannot support specializ ation or economies of scale.

Imagine Korea with the

populatio n density of Sierra Leone; its populatio n would then be only 4 million.
Korea has also benefitte d in recent years from oroximity to "the economic
miracle", Japan, one of the villains in Korea's tragic modern history.

This

_prox:illit y · has provided access to new ideas, new technolog y, and new markets,

particula rly after the signing of the normaliza tion treaty between the two
countries in 1965.

Though blocked from trade with the North, China, and Russia,

location near Japan means that Korea is not nearly so economic ally isolated as
countries like Nepal or Burma.
Because the populatio n is quite homogeneous, there has been none of Ceylon's
linguisti c strife, Malaysia 's ethnic conflict, Northern Ireland's religious
battles, or Nigeria's separatis t warfare,

Political power is highly centraliz ed

because the governmen t has not had to cater to local or regional interests , as in
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Pakistan, nor is Korea saddled with a rigid social structure or tenure system
in which ancestral origin or very skewed land holding determine individual
status and prospects, as in much of Latin America.
the government can govern.

One consequence is that

Korea is not a "soft state" like many of the

South Asian countries Myrdal describes in his Asian Drama.
III. :-- Tb9 Ccmsequcmcrzs :

Evidence of a shift from slow to fast growth in the early 1960's was
found in the behavior of GNP, consumption, and other broad economic aggregates.
The industrialization and urbanization which accompanied this shift were seen
in sectoral-share estimates and demographic data,
their counterpa:.:-t in individual experience.

Such aggregate data have

Accelerated growth has provided

sufficient food and shelter, opportunities for worthwhile employment, and an
optimistic outlook for many persons who had none of these ~nearlier years.

37

Though the average Korean is still quite poor by international standards, he
•

is der.::onstrably better off now than a decaue ag'.:>c

38

Statistical 2.ggregates do not reveal the physical transformation which
has accompanied rapid growth~ however, nor do they show qualitative changes.
Any foreign visitor who stays long enough or returns mrer a period of years can
see the new bui:1_dings ,md highways.

increased traffic congestion and air

pol:!:~tion are also visible~ though ,~.ot acknowledged in the national income
statistics.

We know that one of every 14 Koreans lived in Seoul in 1949;

~he figure is now one in six,

l·ie

do not ree.lly know~ though) how urbanization

and industrialization have influer.ced the pac-= of life, family structure, or
the individual's sense of identity,
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There are clearly non-economic as well as economic costs and benefits of
rapid economic expansion.

The realistic alternative to rapid growth is slow

growth rather than no growth,

Given past rates of population increase in

Korea, slow growth entails little or no improvement in individual welfare. 39
It is not clear how the balance of costs and benefits changes as growth
accelerates.

The economist's efficiency criteria are essentially static (one

chooses among alternatives when everything else is "given") and provide no
answere here.

We all know that "haste makes waste," and every beginning

economics student is taught that supply is more elastic in the long run than
in the short run.

Still, given the choice, most neople

and governments --

in developing nations would choose rapid rather than slow growth.

With low

living standards and high rates of population increase, this is hardly surprising.
Cost-benefit considerations of the sort raised here tend to be specu
lative because there is no actual alternative to use as a measuring stick, and
intuitive because the costs and benefits are essentially incommensurable. 40
Prospects for the future, surprisingly, are more certain,

This becomes less

surprising, however, when one considers that the press is already carrying
articles on the Third Plan 1972-1976) and that orevious events have future
consequences.
Extrapolation of past trends is normally used to predict future develop
ments, and there is no reeson why Korea 7 s progress in the 1970 1 s should not
resemble that in the second half of the 1960 1 s ~-f allowance is made for the
effects of an even-larger base on growth rates,

Past successes and neglect

of particular problems are likely to alter the future path of development, however.
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Agricultural modernization and manpower development, for example, are
to receive more emphasis in the Third Plan period than in the past.
are cases of previous neglect.

These

The costs of backward agriculture are

evidently beginning to outweigh the benefits (more resources available for
allocation elsewhere), while the previous assumption that the labor supply
would impose no constraints on growth is probably no longer true. 41
A moderate growth rate (8.5 percent per year) is projected in the Third
Plan.

Development of the heavy machinery industry is to be encouraged.

Greater

reliance on domestic saving and an improved balance of payments are additional,
related targets.

42

These are, in a sense, goals which result from past success.

Rapid growth has been led by exports of light manufactures

o

The equipment and

much of the materials used to produce these exports have been imported, and
financed in large part by borrowing abroad, which has increased dependence on
foreign saving and led to current-account deficits in the balance of payments.
Insofar as heavy machinery and other investment goods are produced locally,
less foreign borrowing will be necessary.

The net result, then, will be to

increase the importance of domestic saving and reduce current-account deficits
in the balance of payments.
Export-led growth of light manufactures has provided access to foreign
exchange, created opportunities for employmenti built manufacturing capacity,
and generated impressive growth rates.

The rising opportunity costs of

emphasis on export promotion are reflected in Korea's increasingly overtaxed
infrastructure, comparative neglect of agriculture and manpower requirements,
and the postponement of previous plans for developing a petrochemical complex,
integrated steel mill, and other heavy, import-substitute manufactures like
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machinery.

43

Preliminary evidence indicates that the new elements in the

Third Plan are designed to reduce these costs.
The sort of investment required to meet the new plan goals tends to be
more expensive than investment in production for export.

That is, capital

requirement s (capital/ou tput ratios) are much higher in the transport,
communicat ions, or power industries, for example, than in building export
capacity.

Agricultura l modernizati on and manpower development require over

haul of educational administrat ion, creation of an effective extension service,
and other kinds of institution al change which may take decades to achieve.
The really cheap sources of growth, in short, have already been exploited.
This is one reason that the Third Plan's projected growth rate is below rates
achieved in recent years.

44

The main single determinant of Korea's growth in the near future is
likely to remain export expansion.

Either more exports or fewer imports will

be required to right the balance of payments and reduce dependence on foreign
Import substitutio n, as experience elsewhere indicates, has proven
45
to be a poor alternative to export expansion in closing the trade gap.

saving.

Until this gap is closed, growth will not be "self-susta ined," to revert to
Rostow's terminology .
Export expansion has benefitted from diversifica tion, both in markets
and in products, and from a combination of low labor costs and a technologic al
base which have allowed Korean exporters to ex!)loit comparative advantage in
producing relatively simple, labor-inten sive manufacture s.

Diversifica tion

has kept market shares small and thus reduced the likelihood of trade restriction .
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It has also limited the risk associated with instability in markets for
particular products.

Although protectionist sentiment in high-wage countries

is still a potential threat to Korean exports, as are the winding do~m of
war in Vietnam and the U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea, the main problem is
internal.

46

Korean exports are maintained by subsidy.

The amount of subsidy needed

to bring forth exports depends, in turn, on producers' costs and productivity.
Manufacturing output more than doubled between 1965 and 1969 while employment
rose only 50 percent.

Productivity (output per worker) clearly increased,

but wages did too, alnost two-and-a-half times.

This wage increase has

outstripped productivity growth so that unit labor costs rose, profits fell,
and more subsidy has been needed.

47

Such developments cannot continue indef

initely.
Agricultural modernization, education and training, and the ~overnment's
ability to meet social needs are among the more important internal factors
which should influence the pace of economic development and levels of individual
welfare in the long run.

"Agricultural modernization" requires the raisinp,

of wages and productivity in rural areas to approximate industrial levels.
Increased productivity will probably not lead to self-sufficiency in food
production, however, nor is it clear that such self-sufficiency is desirable. 48
Modernization may or may not hasten the farmers' cityward flight, depending upon
the· labor-irltep.sity ·of new production techniques;, but it should r~duce the

disparity between farm,; and non-farm incomes.

This disparity is a likely cause

of increasing income. inequa1ity which, in turn, is a potential source of
political unrest.

49
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The demand for new skills, like that for electricity, seems to increase more
than proportionately with economic growth.

Korea's trained manpower has

been a major asset in the past, to the point that doctors, nurses, miners,
and construction workers have been sent abroad to induce foreign-exchange
earnings.

Yet manpower projections indicate both shortage and surplus of

particular skills (in particular, a shortage of technicians) that show no
•

s i gn o f a b ating.

50

Korea is also a major victim of the "brain drain." The

relative economic status of teachers has probably declined in recent yet.ts,
while the educational system suffers from administrative inflexibility. 51
The system clearly needs to be reformed if manpower bottlenecks are not to
strangle growth in the future.
Korea's pattern of government expenditure differs from that of other
Asian countries (and more economically mature nations as well) in that outlays
.
.
are quite
f or soc i a 1 services
mo d est. 52

There are historic and social reasons

for this; moreover, private foreign agencies have assumed part of the welfare
burden in the years after the Korean Har.

Yet rapid urbanization has raised

the social or external costs of living for many city dHellers while the
extended family, the individual's traditional shelter in the time of need, has been
eroded by city life styles.

Again, as in the case of agricultural modernization,

recent trends carry the threat of political disturbance.

Government action

will be necessary to meet social needs, if only to maintain political stability.
Economists will probably note the absence of reference to market
allocation or stabilization programs here.

The reason is simple. Korea's

basic economic problems are problems of growth rather than stability, the
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government's economic role if pervasive, and conventional market allocation
criteria are generally inapplicable.

Others may wonder why nothing was said

of administrative, ecological, or health problems, all of which have economic
effects.

The need for brevity and the tenets of comparative advantage both

argued for the ommissions.
Questions of procedure and coverage or discussion of particular economic
problems should not be allowed to obscure the essential finding here:

A basic

shift in the pace of growth took place during the early 1960 's that transformed
Korea from just another stagnant, underdeveloped country into one of the world's
fastest growing economies.

Hhether this was the "take-off" or not, as Rostow

has used the term, is debatable,

Hhatever the term, rapid grm'1'th experienced

in Korea is most unusual, and merits the attention it has begun to receive.
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The Korean Economy Since 1953 * - 1

Gross
National
Product
(1)
422
447
475
480
523
552
576
589
614
635
693
750
806
914
995
1,127
1,306
1,436 (P)

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

*

p .
rice -a/
Annual
Increase (%) Index:
1965=100
in (1)
(2)

6.0
6.1
1.2
8.8
5.5
4.4
2.3
4.2
3.5
9.1
8.3
7.4
13.4
8.9
13.3
15.9
9.7 (P)

(3)
11.4
15.0
24.5
31.7
37.8
37.6
38.4
41.9
48.4
54.9
70.4
92.9
100.0
112.9
124.8
139.8
156.7
178.7 (P)

Population I!_/
{thousands)

Private
Consumption
ExEenditure

(4)

(5)

21,546

362
381
423
445
471
486
509
523
528
569
588
620
669
717
784
874
970

21,502
22,307
22,949
23,611
24,291
24,989
25,700
26,432
27,184
27,958
28,670
29,193
29,784
30,469
31,139
31,461

(C)

(C)

(C)

(C)

All figures are billions of~, expressed in constant (1965)
market prices, unless otherwise indicated.

2,./ Implicit deflator for GNP.
b/

Census figures for September 1 (1955), October 1 (1966, 1970),
December 1 (1960), others are end-of-year estimates, except for
1967-1969 (July 1 estimates).

P

Preliminary .
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The Korean Economy Since 1953 - continued - 2

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Per Capita
Consumption
(1,000 ~ )

Gross
Domestic
Capital
Formation

(6)=(5) ..-(4)

(7)

16~8
19.7
19.9
20.5
20.6
20.9
20.9
20.6
21.5
2L6
22.2
23.3
24.6
26.3
28.7
31.1

70
58
61
57
88
78
58
62
73
78
137
114
118

207
2lf2
344
451

Investment
Ratio

Saving
Foreign
(8)

70
50
71

87
103
83
60
69
53
77

107
59
52
86
111
177
211

S:/

Domestic

(%)

(9)=(7)-(8) (10)=(7)¼(1)

0
8
···10
-30
-15
-5
-2
-7
20
1
30
55
66
121
131
167
240

16.5
12.9
12.9
11.9
16.8
14.1
10.0
10.6
11.9
12.3
19.8
15.2
14.7
22.7
24.3
30.5
34.6

Foreign saving was derived by subtracting exports plus net factor
income from abroad from imports.
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The Korean Economy Since 1953 - continuad.- 3

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

d/
e/

ii
.s_/

l1erchandise

Industrial Origin of GDP !::.,I(%)

Exports 2.,/

Imports :J_/

Balance :J_/

Primary!/

Secondary Jl/

Other

(11)

(12)

(13)=(11)-(12)

(14)

(15)

(16)

39.7
25.1
17.7
25.3
19.5
17.3
19.8
32. 9
40.9
54.8
86.8
120.0
175.1
250.3
334. 7
486.2
658.3

347.1
241.2
327.0
380.1
390.4
343.7
273.4
305.4
283.1
390.1
497.0
364.9
420.3
679.9
908.9
1,322.0
1,655.9

-307.4
-216.1
-309. 3
-354. 8
-370.9
-326.4
-253,,6
-272.5
-242.5
-335. 3
-410.2
-244.9
-245.2
-429.6
-574.2
-835. 8
-997.6

51.2
51.8
50.1
47.0
47.0
47.5
45.2
44.3
46.5
42.5
41.7
44.6
41.3
40.7
35.8
32.0
30.7

8.9
9.7
11.1
13.0
13.3
13.7
14.4
15.4
15.1
17.0
18.2
17.8
20.2
20.6
23.6
26.1
27.4

Hillions of U.S. dollars.
Grots domestic product at 1965 constant factor cost.

Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.
Mining, manufacturing, electricity and gas.

Sources:

Bank of Korea (BOK), Economic Statistics Yearbooks; BOK,
Monthly Economic Statistics; Economic Planning Board (EPB),
Korea Statistical Yearbooks.

39.9
38.5
38.8
40.0
39.7
38.8
40.4
40.3
38.4
40.5
40.1
37.6
38.5
38.7
40.6
41.9
41.9

Footnotes

1.

W. W, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth:

A Non-Communist Manifesto

(1960), P• 7.

2.

l»id., P• 57.

3.

The main lines of criticism are as follows:

a - modern growth has

generally been continuous rather than discontinuous, with few clearly
defined "stages"; b - stage theory imposes specious uniformity on
economic history, whose essential characteristic is diversity;
c - the analysis is non-operationa l.

That is, one can only confirm

that the "preconditions" for take-off existed after the fact, or that
a take-off actually occurred if growth were subsequently sustained.
See W.W. Rostow, edo, The Economics of the Take-off into Sustained
Growth (1964).
4.

Figures on CNP growth rates during 1960-1967 for most countries can
be found in the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
(1968), Vol. II, Table 5-B,

5.

The Korea Times, June 20, 1969.

The take-off stage normally takes

several decades, according to Rostow.
6.

An article on the Korean economy in the :"forgan Guaranty Survey of

October 1970, for instance, is entitled "South Korea:

Asia's Newest

Growth Economy."

7.

A logarithmic scale, which assigns equal distances to the same percentage
changes, would perhaps have been more appropriate here.

The absolute

gap does not begin to close until 1966 (see chart), but the percentage
gap (see table, column 1) begins to narrow in 1963 as annual percentage

- 29 -

increases rise above the 1953-1969 average.
_8.

Though -three stages might be distinguished from column 2 (slow growth
from 1953 through 1958 or 1959, stagnation from 1960 through 1962,
and rapid growth thereafter), simplicity of exposition and examination
of causal £actors both suggest that two stages are sufficient.

9.

Investment and increase in output are conventionally linked by the
incremental capital/output ratio.

This measure is too unstable to

be a useful policy parameter, and too aggregate to reveal the sectoral
shares or shifts in investment which are major determinants of the
investment-output relationship.

The incremental ratio is designed

to show the number of units of investment required to increase the
annual product flow (GNP) by one unit.

(A lagged relation is usually

employed to calculate the ratio since this period's investment is
unlikely to increase output until the next period).

The average

annual rate of increase in real GNP for the United States in 1963-1969
was 4.8 percent, for example.
averaged 15 percent.

The investment ratio in 1967-1969

Though the implied aggregate incremental capital/

output ~atio (3.8:1) was considerably higher than Korea's (2.0:1),
when one tries to explain the difference, it is necessary to examine
variation between the two countries in the sectoral allocation of
investment, amount of excess capacity, and in relative prices and inputs
of lalor and capital.

The aggregate capital/output ratio hides more

than it reveals here.
10.

The index of manufacturing production (1965=100) rose most rapidly
after 1964.

Production doubled during the five-year period from
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1959 to 1964, and then tripled between 1964 and 1969.

By 1969, exports

accounted for roughly half of value added in manufacturing.
11.

Gross national product originating in agriculture (forestry and fisheries)
was almost three times that originating in manufacturing in 1963.
In addition to arithmetic reasons for slower growth, agricultural
output has grown less rapidly than manufacturing production because
investment in agriculture has been much lower (fixed capital formation,
in constant 1965 prices, totaled 125 billion~ during 1963-69;
the figure for manufacturing was 418 billion}, and labor input declined
(from 4.8 million employed in 1963 to 4.7 million in 1969} while
manufacturing employment doubled.

Agriculture has also suffered from

the well-known difficulties of applying new technology to small-scale,
widely dispersed production units.

Limited access to credit and adverse

cost-price relationships are other factors in Korea which have served
to limit growth of agricultural output.
12.

These figures are based on employment and wage data from the EPB,
Annual Reports on the Economically Active Population, EPB, Annual
Reports on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey. and Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), Reports on the Results of Farm Household
Economy Survey and Production Cost Survey of Agricultural Products.

13.

Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Revie'iv 1 1955, Appendix Tables 8-9.

14.

Output in the fiscal year ending in l1arch 1954 was virtually back to
the prewar level reached in 1949-1950.

"This is a remarkable recovery

by any standard" (John P. Lewis, Reconstruction and Development in

South Korea.

[National Planning Association, December 1955], pp. 18-19).
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15.

Migration from Korea before liberation was so large that "at least
10 percent of the Korean population was abroad" (Lee Chung-myun,
"Population Movement of Korea--Inte rnational Movement," Korean Affairs
[1963], P• 21).

By 1940, Osaka contained the third largest Korean

population after Seoul and P'yongyang (Irene B. Taeuber and George

w.

Barclay, "Korea and the Koreans in the Northeast Asian Region,"

Population Index [October 1950], p. 287).

Return migration was heavy

at the end of World War II but the official statistics published by
the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) and the Supreme Allied
Commander for Japan (SCAP) are too incomplete to estimate gross flows.
16.

"Even the iron water mains and fire

plugs were taken up during the

war and concrete pipes substituted " (Earnest J. Fisher, "Korea Today,"
Far Eastern Quarterly [Hay 1946], p. 263).
17.

Almost 900 thousand were listed as unemployed (from a population of
20.2 million) as late as May 1949.
higher.

18.

Th~ actual number was probably

See Bank of Chosen~ Annual Economic Review, 1949, Table 173.

The Seoul wholesale price index rose almost 800 percent between
April 1945 and September 1945.

These were official prices.

Black

market prices were 20 or 30 times official prices immediately before
the war's end (George M. McCune, Korea Today [1950], p. 103).
19.

This is hardly surprising since Korea's importance to United States
national interests had never been defined (see Soon Sung Cho, Korea
in World Politics:

1940-1950

[1967], Chapter 12).

Also, until it

became evident that Korea was to remain divided, there was no basis
for embarking on a program to develop ene portion of the peninsula.
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20.

The ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration, predecessor to AID)
was scheduled to begin a three-year, 350 million dollar development
program in Korea during fiscal 1950.

Funds for expanding coal and

electric-power output and building fertilizer plants were included in
the program.

See

w.

A. Brown, Jr., and R. Opie, American Foreign

Assistance (1953), pp. 375-76.
21.

Food production (rice and other graius·, pulses, and potatoes) rose
from 3.5 million metric tons in 1949 to 5.4 million tons in 1959.
See UNKRA-FAO, Rehabilitation of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
in South Korea (1954), and HAF, Yearbooks of Agriculture and Forestry
Statistics!

Estimates of agricultural output are especially liable

to error and bias, while sharp year-to-year variation in weather conditions

makes single-year output estimates potentially•misleading indicators
of trend.

Nevertheless, output in the late 1950's was considerably

a.hove that in 1949, the best post-liberation, pre-war year.

A literacy drive after the war helped to reduce the proportion of
illiterates to less than 30 percent by 1960.

·-

The number of primary

school students rose from 1.9 million in 1945 to 3.6 million in 1960
so that two-thirds of all children aged 6-11 were enrolled in primary
schools in the latter year (Central Education Research Institute,

-

Education in Korea 2 1966, p. 105, and EPB, Korea Statistical Yearboo15_, 1966).
Available supply (domestic output plus imports less exports) of
cement, flat glass, newsprint, and tires was largely produced in Korea
by the late 1950's.

22•

The share of mining and manufacturing in net commodity product (e.g.
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the net output of goods originating in agriculture, forestry, fisheries,
mining, and manufacturing) had reached 35-40 percent by 1939-41.
See Suh Sang-chul, "Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy
Since 1910," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1966,
Table II-4.
23.

Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 373.

24.

Korea received over 1.7 billion dollars in official grants and loans
from 1955 through 1960, which amounts to a little over 73 dollars per
person.

25.

The list of policy failures is endless, but insistence on overvaluation
of the~' use of multiple exchange rates, finance of continued
government deficits by borrowing from the central bank, and artificially
low interest payments on savings are the main ones.

26.

President Rhee evidently believed, for instance, that inflation was
caused by exchange devaluation.

My judgment of Rhee's economic policies

may be too harsh, for the sort of institutional change and educational
reform required for economic growth is likely to be slow, and later
progress can be traced back in part to developments under Rhee.

Still,

"his tragedy is that a lifetime devoted to his country should have left
so little of lasting value" (Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee:
An Unauthorized Portrait

27.

{1960], p. 235).

This is not to say that there was no economic planning or any attempts
to coordinate development policies.

A three-year economic plan was

approved three months before the Rhee government was overthrown.
new five-year plan was prepared by the Chang government.

Given

A
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Rhee's anti-planning bias, however, it is unlikely that the plan would
ever have been implemented had he remained in power.

See David C. Cole

and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance of Economic Planning
in Korea," in Irma Adelman, ed., Practical Approaches to Development
Planning:
28.

Korea's Second Five-Year Plan (1969), pp. 12, 16.

Economic achievement has also served political ends.

The ruling

Democratic-Republican party sponsored a referendum in the fall of
1969 to revise the constitution so that the president might serve a
third term.

President Park, campaigning for revision, said "I proposed

the referendum because I thought that retaining the present system•••
will contribute to economic development ••••

I wanted to ••• add the

finishing touch to the vast enterprises of construction I started"
(The Korea Times, October 11, 1969) •
2_9.

See P. W. Kuznets, "Korea's Five-Year Plans,"

in Irma Adelman, ed-.,

op. cit., pp. 41, 54.

3P. Most economists regard price increase as inevitable, and moderate
rates of increase as possibly desirable.

But when rates of increase

rise above five or ten percent a year, price relations become increasingly
distorted and the cost of such distortion is likely to outweigh possible
benefits.

(In Korea, annual price increases averaged over 20 percent

in 1953-60, 19 percent in 1960-65, and 12 percent in 1965-69).
See Graeme S. Dorrance, "The Effect of Inflation on Economic Development,"
IMF Staff Papers, 1963, and Harry G. Johnson, "Is Inflation the Inevitable
Price of Rapid Development or a Retarding Factor in Economic Growth?",
Halayan Economic Review, April 1966.
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31.

The yield on 18-month saving accounts went to 2.5 percent a month,
or more than 34 percent a year!

32.

The Korea Times, April 27 and May 20, 1969.

For a more detailed

description of policy measures, see S. Kanesa-Thasan, "Stabilizing
an Economy:
33.

The Korean Experience, 11 in Irma Adelman, ed., op. cit._,

Balance-of-paym ents categories which combine receipts from-sales to
U.N. forces in Korea with service payments earned by Korean contractors
or troops in Vietnam were not designed for use in determining Korea's
earnings from war in Vietnam.

Similarly, annual reports of the Agency

for International Development show military assistance programs (MAP's)
by country, but not by activity~ so Korea's receipts cannot be obtained
from the MAP budget for Vietnam.

Recent testimony before the U.S.

Senate revealed that military equipment originally valued at 3.4 billion
dollars.had been given to allied governments (Korea was a major recipient)
between 1951 and 1970 for a small fraction of cost, and that nearly
a billion dollars had been paid to finance Korean combat troops in
Vietnam since 1965 (The New York Times, Harch 29, 1970, p. 1, and April 1,
1970, p. l; The Korea Times, September 13, 1970).

One may conclude

that Korea's earnings from the war in Vietnam are hard to define (what
is a ten-year old destroyer worth?), that the balance-of-paym ents figure
used here is too low to measure such earnings (governmen;, n.i.e.,
military credits totaled only 942 million dollars from 1965 through
mid-1970), and that the actual amount--if it were known--would probably
be much higher.
34.

Credi ts under the · 11 government, n. i.e. , military" category in Japan• s
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balance of payments rose from 49 million dollars in 1949 to 803
million in 1953.

This item, which includes sales to military personnel

stationed in Japan as well as sales to U.. N. forces under special
procurement programs in connection with the Korean War, made up

37 percent of Japan's total earnings from sales of goods and services
in 1953.

35.

The expenditure estimate, for 1967, includes private as well as public
outlays.

It was released by the Office of Planning and Control

(see The Korea Times, November 21, 1968).

Internation al comparison

of educational expenditure is difficult because the share of private
outlays in total expenditure varies widely, and because private expenditure
data are often inaccurate or not available.

One comparison, which

includes Korea, is given in Frederic Harbison and Charles A. Myers,
Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth (1964).

36.

That emphasis in Korea has been placed on quantity rather than quality
was noted in the 1965 report of a Unesco advisory team for educational
planning.

37.

The term "sufficient " in this context, particularl y with regard to
food, may be misleading.

Nutritional standards are controversi al and

the published estimates are inconsisten t (see narguerite C. Burk and
Hordecai Ezekiel, "Food and Nutrition in Developing Countries," in
Bruce F. Johnston and Herman 11. Southworth, eds., Agricultura l Development
and Economic Growth [1967]).

The liinistry of Health and Social Affairs

announced recently that the national average caloric intake was 2,105
per day (The Korea Times, December 20, 1970); an earlier study gives a
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figure of 2,438 as the national average for 1958~59 (Y. J. Yu, cited
in E Hyock Kwon, et. al., A Study of Urban Slum Population [1967]).
Still, there is undoubtedly less hunger--and better housing--than there
was a decade ago.

(Data on housing from the 1970 census

of population

and housing are not yet available).
Unemployment statistics are suspect because they are based on
quarterly surveys which cannot adequately reflect seasonal swings in
Also, underemployment is more of a problem than

agricultural work.

unemployment in Korea and most other developing countries.

Both

employment and wage statistics show rapid growth of employment and
wages, though, especially in manufacturing._

Such expansion of employment

in manufacturing and other industrial activities is atypical, and suggests
that unemployment and underemployment have lessened (see, for example,
Charles R. Frank, Jr., "Urban Unemployment and Economic Growth in Africa,"
Oxford Economic Papers, July 1968).

38.

Korea ranked 71st of 80 countries included in a study of real per capita
consumption in 1960.

With the United Kingdom assigned a value of 100,

Korea's index was 6 (see W. Beckerman and R. Bacon, "International
Comparisons of Income Levels:
September 1966).

A Suggested New Measure," Economic Journal,

If all other countries maintained their 1960 consumption

levels, Korea's index would have advanced from 6 to 9 in 1969, but its
rank would only rise from 71st to 61st.
39,.

Rates of population increase and economic growth are probably related,
however..

Interaction between economic and demographic factors is largely

ignored by economists and demographers.

Better medicine and sanitation
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may explain the practically universal decline in mortality which has
occurred during the last few decades, but little is known of the factors,
some economic, which determine fertility.

It hardly seems coincidental

that rapid economic growth in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea has been associated
in recent years with declining rates of population increase, and
unlikely that these rates would have declined or declined as much if
economic growth, urbanization, and industrializati on had been less rapid.
40.

How, for example, are the costs of breaking up the extended family
system to be weighed against the benefits of more to eat for people
living at subsistence levels?

41.

See Roger D. Norton, "Planning with Facts:

The Case of Korea,"

American Economic Review, Hay 1970, pp. 62-63.
skills can be seen in sharp wage increases.

Shortages of particular

Housing repair wages in

Seoul, for example, rose more than any other component of the Seoul
consumer price index from 1965 through 1969.
42.

See, for instance, The Korea Times, l!arch 18, April 16, and September 3,
1970.

43.

New emphasis on any target necessarily implies previous neglect or
revaluation of opportunity costs.

Problems caused by neglect and those

due to success can both be subsumed under the opportunity-co st concept.
The distinction between the two types of problems is raised here
because their causes are different.
program created new difficulties.

In one case a positive, successful
In the other, continued neglect and

a changing situation increased existing problems.
44.

Other reasons are credibility (it is hard to believe that the phenomenal
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1
rates of the late 1960 s can be sustained ) and oppositio n from the central

These last are concerned with

bank and potential foreign aid <loners.

possible inflation ary consequen ces of over-inve stment, and tend to
discourag e ambitious growth targets.

On the other hand, underesti mate

of actual growth in the First and Second Plans has led to transport
and power bottlenec ks because too little investmen t was allocated
for expanding the infrastru cture.
45.

See for example, Alberto. Hirschman , "The Political Economy of Import
11
Substitut ing Industria lization in Latin America, Quarterly Journal of

Economics , February 1968"
46.

Oppositio n to free trade in the United States, one of Korea's major
trading partners, has come mainly from shoe and textile producers
in the last few years"
changed.

has
The unions were strangely silent, but this
j

The electrica l workers' union recently joined the oppositio n,

citing the growth of imports produced by cheap labor in American
See

owned plants abroad, including a TV manufactu ring plant in Korea.
The New York Times, January 3, 1971, Section 3, p. 12.
47.

Value added (GNP originatin g in the manufactu ring sector, in constant
prices) increased 125 percent from 1965 to 1969.
output (1965:;:: 100) was 26.5.3 in 19690

The index of manufactu ring

Manufactu ring employment grew

from 800 to 1,222 thousand during the period.

The average monthly

wage for productio n workers in manufactu ring rose from 4,600
1965 to 11,270 ~on in 1969.

~

in

The increase in the wage bill (number of

employees times ave:;:-age wage) divided by the increase in output
indicates that unit labor costs rose at least 40 percent from 1965
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to 1969.

This increase was partly but not entirely offset by devaluation.

The won fell from approximately 272 per dollar in 1965 to 285 per dollar
by mid-1969.

The Bank of Korea's financial statements analyses show

that profit ratios, however defined, fell from 1965 through 1968.
48.

Each five-year plan has announced the goal of agricultural self-suf
ficiency, but none has provided the means to achieve it.

Given

Korea's high man/land ratio, industrial base, and access to fo~eign
food grains, a program of "self-sufficiency" makes little economic
sense.

The term is evidently a shibboleth which the government feels

obliged to honor for political reasons.
49.

The quantity and quality of Korean statistics are unusually good by
international standards but~ like most developing countries, there is
little or no good income information.

Huch essentially idle speculation

on whether income distribution is becoming less equal has resulted.
The sizeable and growing divergence between farm and non-farm income
and increasing migration from the countryside to cities suggest, however,
that the speculation is probably correct.
50.

Republic of Korea, The Second Five-Year Plan for Development of Science
and Technology:

1967-1971 (1966).

See also Larry E. Westphal, "Labor

Projections," in EPB, Selected Papers on the Third Five-Year Economic
Development Plan (Preparatory Stage), May 1970.
51.

See Horace Underwoodi "Korean Education:

Master of the Future or

Slave of the Past, 11 Korean Quarterly, Autumn 1963.
52.

See United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,
The Planning and Financing of Social Development in the ECAFE Region (1969h'

